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Abstract
In this paper, I will show that it is possible to delete Ex Falso Quodlibet from Classical Logic, without depriving it of any of
its deductive powers. This is done by means of the ambiguity-adaptive logic AALns, which is equivalent to dCR, the deductive
version of Neil Tennant’s CR.
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1. Introduction
When applied to an inconsistent premise set, Classical Logic (CL) leads to the trivial consequence set. In other
words, Ex Falso Quodlibet (EFQ) is valid in CL:
When Γ CL B and Γ CL∼ B, then ∀A : Γ CL A.
However, as there are a lot of inconsistent, but non-trivial (scientific) theories, CL cannot be the logic underly-
ing human reasoning in inconsistent contexts (see [8]). As a consequence, a lot of paraconsistent logics have been
proposed in order to replace CL in those contexts. But, although they all avoid EFQ, they all weaken the deductive
strength of CL in one way or another. This means that they do not succeed in isolating EFQ from CL, and as such
they are unable to derive some genuine classical consequences of the premise set, consequences which
do not follow from their premises only because of the joint inconsistency of those premises.1
For example, consider the premise set Γ = {p,∼p,p ∨ ∼p ∨ q}. It is obvious that we do not need to “abuse” the
inconsistency of the premises (which is how EFQ is established) in order to derive q from Γ . As q is in a sense part
of the premises, we should be allowed to use Disjunctive Syllogism (DS) twice in order to derive it, even though Γ
is inconsistent. But, there is no paraconsistent logic which allows for this derivation, because (1) it is based on an
inconsistent premise set (Rescher and Manor [9]), (2) DS is invalidated in the logic (Priest [7], da Costa [6], . . . ), or
(3) there has been made use of unreliable (read: inconsistent) information (Batens [1]). However, this implies that the
E-mail address: hans.lycke@ugent.be.
URL: http://logica.ugent.be/hans.
1 See [12, p. 709]. My italics.1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jal.2006.03.011
H. Lycke / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 602–612 603existent paraconsistent logics not only avoid the “abuse” we can make of an inconsistent premise set by means of the
classical derivation rules (EFQ-derivation), but that they also limit the “relevant use” we can make of those derivation
rules (relevant CL-derivation).
Obviously, the question which follows from this, is whether we can delete Ex Falso Quodlibet from Classical Logic
without depriving it of any of its deductive powers. In other words, is it possible to decide for any Δ CL A whether
A ‘follows’ from Δ by dint of Δ’s inconsistency, rather than by dint of any genuine deductive connection between
Δ and A.2
In [10] and [11], Neil Tennant proved it to be possible to split up CL-proofs into explosive classical proofs and relevant
classical proofs. 3,4 The consequences of explosive classical proofs solely depend on the inconsistency of that premise
set in order to be derivable, while the consequences of relevant classical proofs follow from the premises by “relevant
use” of the classical derivation rules. In other words, relevant classical proofs give us all and only those classical
consequences of a premise set that are somehow “in” the premises, as f.e. q is in the premise set {p,∼p,p∨∼p∨q}.5
In Section 2 below, I will present Tennant’s theory of relevant (classical) proofs, called Compassionate Relevantism
(CR) in [12], and I will show how it can be used to capture relevant classical deduction. I will call this theory of
relevant classical deduction dCR, the deductive version of CR.
In Section 3, I will present the ambiguity-adaptive logic AALns, and in Section 4, I will show that AALns also
captures relevant classical deduction by proving the equivalence with dCR.6
2. Relevant classical proofs: CR
In this section, I will describe the semantics of Neil Tennant’s CR,7 and I will show that it can be used to capture
relevant classical deduction, because of the fact that CR isolates EFQ from CL (see [10] and [11]).
First of all, I have to mention that Tennant uses set sequents to characterize CR. These are “formulas” of the form
Δ : Θ with Δ and Θ being sets of well-formed formulas of classical logic (CL) in which the order and the repetition
of elements are irrelevant. In the following, I will restrict the succedent set Θ to the singleton A. This will not lead to
a change in the logic.
Tennant states that Δ CR A expresses that there is a relevant classical proof of A from Δ, whenever Δ : A is an
entailment. Whether or not a sequent is an entailment, depends on the following definitions:
Definition 1. A valid sequent Δ : A is a sequent, of which there exists no CL-model which makes all elements of Δ
true and A false.
Definition 2. A perfectly valid sequent Δ : A is a sequent which is valid and which has no valid proper subsequents.
Definition 3. A proper subsequent of a sequent Δ : A is
(a) a sequent Δ′ : A with Δ′ ⊂ Δ (meaning that not all elements of Δ are needed in order to derive A), or
(b) the sequent Δ : ∅ (meaning that Δ is inconsistent).
Definition 4. A sequent Δ′ : A′ is a suprasequent of Δ : A, iff there is a function s which replaces each sentential
letter from Δ : A by a (possibly complex) formula, so that s(Δ : A) = Δ′ : A′.
2 See [12, p. 706]. In this quote, I have adapted Tennant’s logical notation to mine in order to preserve overall coherence.
3 To be clear, this is my terminology.
4 Also Batens has showed that it is possible to isolate EFQ from CL (see [3]). His approach was based on the goal directed proof procedure from
Batens and Provijn [5]. In a sense, one could say that AALns is one of the possible representations of the logic behind the proof procedure from [3].
5 Remark that this notion of relevance does not apply to the implication (as it does for relevant logics), but to the deduction process. This is why
Tennant also likes to call it “relevance at the turnstile”.
6 For reasons of simplicity, I will restrict myself to the propositional version of both CR, dCR and AALns , although I will show in Section 3.3.4
how propositional AALns can be upgraded to the predicative level.
7 For the proof theory, I refer to [11].
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These definitions show us the relevance-criteria incorporated in CR. First of all, an inconsistent premise set is
treated as if it is a consistent one. This is done by looking for a consistent interpretation of an inconsistent premise
set. Let me illustrate this by means of an example:
Example 1. There is a relevant classical proof of q from {p,∼p,p ∨ ∼p ∨ q}, because {p,∼p,p ∨ ∼p ∨ q} : q is
an entailment. The latter is the case, because {r,∼p,p ∨ ∼r ∨ q} : q is a perfectly valid suprasequent of {p,∼p,p ∨
∼p ∨ q} : q .
Secondly, as only the premises which are needed for deriving a consequence from a premise set are considered
relevant for that consequence, entailments always have minimal premise sets. This is not problematic for Tennant,
as he tried to capture what a relevant classical proof is, but it certainly is not to be considered as relevant classical
deduction. The following example will show us why:
Example 2. Because {p,∼p ∨ q} : q is an entailment, {∼p,p,∼p ∨ q} : q is not an entailment, even though {p ∧
∼p,∼p ∨ q} : q , and {p,∼p ∧ (∼p ∨ q)} : q are entailments in CR.
Does this mean that there is no relevant proof of q from {∼p,p,∼p ∨ q}? In a sense it does, as this set contains
more elements than we really need in order to derive q . But of course this should not mean that q cannot relevantly
be deduced from the premise set Γ = {∼p,p,∼p ∨ q}, as there is a relevant proof from a subset of Γ . Nevertheless,
it is obvious that CR can be used in order to capture relevant classical deduction:
Definition 6. A sequent Δ : A expresses that there is a relevant classical deduction of A from Δ, whenever there is a
Δ′ ⊆ Δ for which Δ′ : A is an entailment.
However, a major drawback of this semantical characterization of relevant classical deduction, which I will call
deductive Compassionate Relevantism (dCR), is that there is no proof theory accompanying it. There is only a proof
theory (stated in sequent calculus) for CR, or in other words, for deciding whether or not a sequent is an entailment.
In Sections 3 and 4, it will be shown that this drawback can be overcome by using the ambiguity-adaptive logic
AALns to characterize relevant classical deduction.
3. The ambiguity-adaptive logic AALns
In this section, I will present the ambiguity-adaptive logic AALns, for which it will be shown in Section 4 that it
isolates EFQ from CL, by proving its equivalence with dCR.
In Section 3.1, I will describe the language schema of AALns. In Section 3.2, I will present the paraconsistent logic
AmbL. In Section 3.3, I will present the adaptive logic AALns.
3.1. The language schema of ambiguity logic
Let L be the language of Propositional Classical Logic (CL), with S and W respectively the sets of sentential
letters and well-formed formulas.
The first step towards ambiguity logic is the construction of the language LI . In order to get LI , we change the
language L of CL in the following way:
• SI =df {Ai | A ∈ S, and i ∈ N}.8
• WI is defined in LI in the same way W is defined in L.
In view of what is to come, also the following definition is very useful:
8 An Ai ∈ SI is called an indexed letter.
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1. AI ∈WI , and
2. when we drop the indices from AI , we get A (∈W).
3.1.1. Ambiguous premise sets
For our purposes, we want our premise set to be maximally ambiguous. Therefore, we will define the set of maxi-
mally ambiguous interpretations I(Γ ) of Γ :
Definition 8. Γ max ∈ I(Γ ) iff
1. Γ max ⊂WI , and
2. every indexed letter occurs maximally once in Γ max, and
3. when we drop the indices from Γ max, we get Γ (⊂W).
Because, in our approach, all Γ max ∈ I(Γ ) will lead to the same consequences in AALns, it is better to pick out
one member to represent them all. We will denote that member by Γ I .
3.2. The paraconsistent logic AmbL
The logic AmbL is defined as follows:
Definition 9. Γ AmbL A iff there is at least one AI ∈ I(A), for which Γ I CL AI .
It is easily seen that AmbL is a paraconsistent logic. As all indexed letters occur only once in Γ I , it is necessarily
consistent, which makes it impossible in CL to derive any unwanted consequence (= derived by means of EFQ) from
it, even when Γ is inconsistent.
Example 3. In CL, we can derive q from the premise set Γ = {p,∼p}, but we cannot derive any qI ∈ I(q) from
Γ I = {p1,∼p2}.
It is also immediately clear that AmbL will not allow for a lot of genuine consequences to be derivable.
Example 4. In CL, we can derive q from the (consistent) premise set Γ = {p,∼p ∨ q}, but we cannot derive q1 from
Γ I = {p1,∼p2 ∨ q1}.
This problem can be overcome by interpreting the premise set Γ I as unambiguous as possible, which means that
we will interpret as identical, all indexed letters which only differ from each other with regard to their index, as long as
there is no reason to do otherwise. This should allow us to derive all and only the genuine consequences of a premise
set.
3.3. Interpreting a premise set as unambiguous as possible
In order to interpret Γ I as unambiguous as possible, I will make use of the general framework of ambiguity-
adaptive logics. Ambiguity-adaptive logics are a branch of adaptive logics, first proposed by Guido Vanackere in [13].
As a consequence, the ambiguity-adaptive logic AALns proposed below, is a standard ambiguity-adaptive logic, which
differs from those proposed by Guido Vanackere in [14,15] in that it makes use of a different adaptive strategy, the
Normal Selections Strategy.
In short, the ambiguity-adaptive logic AALns can be characterized as follows:
Definition 10. Γ AALns A iff there is at least one AI ∈ I(A), for which Γ I CLns AI .
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Γ I as unambiguous as possible. In order to avoid confusion, in the following, I will always use “CLns” to refer to
the adaptive logic CLns as applied to a maximally ambiguous premise set Γ I . Moreover, as it is CLns which does
the actual work, it will be CLns which I will describe in the rest of this section. To be more precise, in Section 3.3.1,
I will show how CLns fits the standard format of adaptive logics. In Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, the proof theory and the
semantics of CLns will be given. Finally, in Section 3.3.4, the predicative version of CLns will be introduced.
3.3.1. The standard format
Following the standard format for adaptive logics as explicated in [2], CLns will be characterized by three compo-
nents: a lower limit logic, a set of abnormalities and an adaptive strategy.
The lower limit logic (LLL) is the stable part of an adaptive logic (AL), since all LLL-consequences of a premise
set are AL-consequences of that premise set as well:
Theorem 1. If Γ LLL A, then also Γ AL A.
The LLL of CLns is the logic CL, as applied to an ambiguous premise set Γ I . This means that the logic AmbL
(see Section 3.2) is the LLL of the logic AALns.
The set of abnormalities of CLns is the set Ω :
Definition 11. Ω = {∼(Ai ≡ Aj) | Ai,Aj ∈ SI}.
Below, Dab(Δ) will always refer to a disjunction of members of a finite Δ ⊆ Ω . Such a disjunction of abnormalities
is also called a Dab-formula. A Dab-formula which has been derived from a premise set by means of the LLL is called
a Dab-consequence of that premise set.
In an adaptive logic, the set of abnormalities is the set of formulas which we suppose to be false until or unless it
is impossible to do otherwise. In fact, this comes down to the following:
Conjecture 1. If Γ LLL A ∨ Dab(Δ) then Γ AL A, unless. . .
How the “unless”-clause should be interpreted, depends on the adaptive strategy of the adaptive logic under con-
sideration.9 For CLns, this is the Normal Selections Strategy (NS-strategy), which means that we should interpret the
“unless”-clause as follows:
Theorem 2. If Γ LLL A ∨ Dab(Δ) then Γ AL A, unless Γ LLL Dab(Δ).
To make this more concrete, consider again Example 4 from Section 3.2. Although it is obvious that Γ I CL q1, it
is also obvious that Γ I CL q1 ∨ ∼(p1 ≡ p2), so that q1 is derivable from Γ I by CLns, unless Γ I CL ∼(p1 ≡ p2).
As the latter is not the case, we can conclude that Γ I CLns q1, and also that Γ AALns q .
3.3.2. The proof theory of CLns
The proof theory of CLns, and adaptive proof theory in general, has a few characteristic features. I will first describe
these features, before I will give the specific deduction rules and the marking rule of CLns.
First of all, the lines in a CLns-proof consist of five elements: (i) a line number, (ii) a formula, (iii) the line numbers
of the formulas from which the formula is derived, (iv) the rule by which the formula is derived, and (v) an adaptive
condition. The latter is a set of abnormalities, and should be considered as the proof theoretical “unless”-clause. This
means that the formula of a line with a non-empty condition Δ, is considered as derived only if Dab(Δ) is not (yet)
derived on a line in the proof.
This first characteristic feature of CLns-proofs immediately leads to the second one: the dynamic nature of the
proofs. For proofs to be dynamic means that formulas, derived at a certain stage of the proof, can become underived
9 The best known adaptive strategies are the reliability and the minimal abnormality strategies, which I do not discuss here. For more information,
see [2].
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the adaptive condition of a formula A derived at stage s of the proof, is derived at a later stage s +n, then that formula
A should be removed from the proof at stage s + n, as it can not be considered as a consequence of the premises
anymore. That a formula should be considered as removed from the proof, will be made clear by marking it.
3.3.2.1. Deduction rules Let us have a look at the deduction rules, which are presented in a generic format. There
are three of them. The first one (PREM) enables us to introduce elements from the premise set into the proof. The
second one is an unconditional rule (RU) which means that it doesn’t add a new element to the adaptive condition of
the formulas it enables us to derive. Finally, the third one is a conditional rule (RC) which means that it does add a
new element to the adaptive condition of the formulas it enables us to derive.
PREM If AI ∈ Γ I , one may add a line comprising the following elements: (i) an appropriate line number, (ii) AI ,
(iii)–, (iv) PREM, and (v) ∅.
RU If AI1 , . . . ,A
I
n CL BI and each of AI1 , . . . ,AIn occurs in the proof on lines i1, . . . , in that have conditions
Δ1, . . . ,Δn respectively, one may add a line comprising the following elements: (i) an appropriate line num-
ber, (ii) BI , (iii) i1, . . . , in, (iv) RU, and (v) Δ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Δn.
RC If AI1 , . . . ,A
I
n CL BI ∨ Dab(Θ) and each of AI1 , . . . ,AIn occurs in the proof on lines i1, . . . , in that have
conditions Δ1, . . . ,Δn respectively, one may add a line comprising the following elements: (i) an appropriate
line number, (ii) BI , (iii) i1, . . . , in, (iv) RC, and (v) Δ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Δn ∪ Θ .
3.3.2.2. Marking rule Consider the following marking criterion which acts upon the conditions of lines derived in a
proof.
Definition 12. Abs(Γ I) =df {Θ | Dab(Θ) is a Dab-consequence of Γ I at stage s of the proof}.
Definition 13. Marking for CLns: line i is marked at stage s of the proof iff, where Δ is its condition, there is a Θ for
which: Θ ⊆ Δ and Θ ∈ Abs(Γ I).
3.3.2.3. Final derivability In order to complete the proof theory, we also need the following (standard) definitions
considering Final Derivability:
Definition 14. AI is finally derived from Γ I on line i of a proof at stage s iff (i) AI is the second element of line i,
(ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) any extension of the proof will not result in a marking of line i.
Definition 15. Γ I CLns AI (AI is finally CLns-derivable from Γ I ) iff AI is finally derived on a line of a proof
from Γ I .
3.3.2.4. Some examples First, consider the CLns-proof based on the premise set Γ I = {p1, q1,∼p2 ∨ r1,∼q2 ∨
s1,∼p3 ∨ ∼q3}.
1 p1 PREM ∅
2 q1 PREM ∅
3 ∼p2 ∨ r1 PREM ∅
4 ∼q2 ∨ s1 PREM ∅
5 r1 ∨ ∼(p1 ≡ p2) 1,3;RU ∅
6 r1 5;RC {∼(p1 ≡ p2)}
10 Adding a line to a proof is equivalent with moving on to a next stage of that proof.
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8 s1 7;RC {∼(q1 ≡ q2)}
9 ∼p3 ∨ ∼q3 PREM ∅
10 t1 ∨ ∼(p1 ≡ p3) ∨ ∼(q1 ≡ q3) 1,2,9;RU ∅
11 t1 10;RC {∼(p1 ≡ p3),∼(q1 ≡ q3)} 
12 ∼(p1 ≡ p3) ∨ ∼(q1 ≡ q3) 1,2,9;RU ∅
The formula on line 12 is the only Dab-formula derived in the proof, and as the formula on line 11 has been derived on
a condition which contains the abnormalities of this Dab-consequence, it gets marked. About the other conditionally
derived formulas, it is easily verified that they all have been finally derived.
Notice that the non-marked formulas cannot get marked by extending the premise set, because an extension cannot
contain the indexed letters needed to derive the Dab-consequences which would lead to the marking of those formulas
(if it would contain those indexed letters, the extended premise set would not be maximally ambiguous anymore).
This means that the logic CLns (and by extension also AALns) is monotonic.
Now, consider the CLns-proof based on the premise set Γ I = {p1,∼p2,∼p3 ∨ p4 ∨ q1}.
1 p1 PREM ∅
2 ∼p2 PREM ∅
3 ∼p3 ∨ p4 ∨ q1 PREM ∅
4 q1 ∨ ∼(p1 ≡ p3) ∨ ∼(p2 ≡ p4) 1,2,3;RU ∅
5 q1 4;RC {∼(p1 ≡ p3),∼(p2 ≡ p4)}
It is easily seen that q1 will not get marked by any extension of the proof. This example shows us that q is AALns-
derivable form {p,∼p,∼p ∨ p ∨ q}, which is a clear indication that AALns is able to derive all relevant classical
consequences of a premise set, whether or not that premise set is inconsistent.
Moreover, the CLns-proof theory also gives us an intuitive grasp on how the logic AALns is able to isolate EFQ
from CL. The key lays with the interplay between the indices and the conditional rule RC. By coupling the conditional
rule to the indices, an adaptive CLns-proof can keep track of the use (sometimes called negation-elimination) that was
made in the deduction process of specific occurrences of sentential letters of Γ . And, as all indices occur only once
in the premise set Γ I , the derivation of a Dab-formula shows us that derivations which have made use of that Dab-
formula, are based solely on the inconsistency of the premise set Γ . Consequently, the indices provide us with a clear
understanding of the difference between relevant and irrelevant consequences of a premise set, and between the “use”
and the “abuse” of the premises.
3.3.3. The semantics of CLns
As for all adaptive logics, the semantics of CLns works according to the following two principles:
(1) Select (one or more) elements (the selected sets) from the set of all possible subsets of the set of all LLL-
models of a premise set. How this is done differs according to the chosen adaptive strategy. For the NS-strategy,
a subset of the set of all possible subsets of LLL-models of a premise set gets selected when it contains only
minimal abnormal LLL-models (= models for which there are no other models that verify only a subset of the
abnormalities they verify) which all verify exactly the same abnormalities.
(2) State that a formula follows from a premise set by means of the adaptive logic, if it is verified by all models from
at least one selected set.
The definitions below will show us how the semantics of CLns fits into this general semantical framework of adaptive
logics.
First, let M AI (resp. M  Γ I ) denote that a model M verifies the formula AI (resp. all members of Γ I ). Now:
Definition 16. For every CL-model M: Ab(M) = {AI ∈ Ω | M AI}.
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Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 18. Φ(Γ I) = {Ab(M) | M is a minimal abnormal CL-model of Γ I}.
Definition 19. A set Σ of CL-models of Γ I is a selected set iff, for some ϕ ∈ Φ(Γ I), Σ = {M | M  Γ I;
Ab(M) = ϕ}.
Definition 20. Γ I CLns AI iff AI is verified by all members of a selected set of CL-models of Γ I .
3.3.3.1. Soundness and completeness Soundness and completeness for adaptive logics based on the NS-strategy
have been proven in [4]. As a consequence:
Theorem 3. Γ I CLns AI iff Γ I CLns AI .
Theorem 4. Γ AALns A iff Γ AALns A.
3.3.4. The predicative version of CLns
Until now, I have only considered the propositional fragment of CLns. In this section, however, I will show how
predicative CLns can be obtained.
In fact, upgrading propositional CLns to predicative CLns is quite simple. The only elements of propositional CLns
that change fundamentally, are (1) the language schema, and (2) the set of abnormalities Ω . The rest remains basically
the same, and will not be discussed here.
3.3.4.1. The predicative language schema Let L be the language of predicative Classical Logic, with S , Pr , C, V
and W respectively the sets of sentential letters, predicates of rank r , individual constants, individual variables and
well-formed formulas. The language LI is obtained from L in the following way:
• SI =df {Ai | A ∈ S, and i ∈ N}.
• PrI =df {πi | π ∈Pr , and i ∈ N}.
• CI =df {βi | β ∈ C, and i ∈ N}.
• WI is defined in LI in the same way W is defined in L.
To conclude, two remarks about individual variables. First of all, they do not get an index. Second, they do not range
over individual constants (elements of C), but over indexed individual constants (elements of CI ).
3.3.4.2. The set of abnormalities The set of abnormalities Ω gets extended in the following way:
Definition 21. Ω = Ω1 ∪ Ω2 ∪ Ω3, with
• Ω1 = {∼(Ai ≡ Aj) | Ai,Aj ∈ SI},
• Ω2 = {∼(∀α1) . . . (∀αn)(πiα1 . . . αn ≡ πjα1 . . . αn) | πi,πj ∈PrI},
• Ω3 = {∼(βi = βj ) | βi,βj ∈ CI}.
4. Relevant classical deduction: AALns
In this section, I will show that AALns avoids EFQ without limiting the deductive strength of the classical deriva-
tion rules. In other words, I will show that AALns really captures relevant classical deduction.
In order to do so, I will have to show that (1) whenever the premise set is consistent, AALns and CL lead to the
same consequence set (because all classical consequences can be derived relevantly from a consistent premise set),
and (2) whenever the premise set is inconsistent, AALns leads to all and only those classical consequences for which
there is a relevant classical derivation.
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It is quite easy to see that AALns and CL will lead to the same consequence set whenever the premise set Γ is
consistent. The Derivability Adjustment Theorem (DAT) for AALns will show us why:
Theorem 5. Γ CL A iff, for at least one AI ∈ I(A), Γ I CL AI ∨ Dab(Δ).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In fact, DAT tells us that whenever a formula A is derivable from a premise set Γ by means of CL, then there
is always an AI ∈ I(A) derivable from Γ I by means of CLns, unless the accompanying Dab-formula is derivable
(remember the standard format of adaptive logics in Section 3.3.1). But, it is easily seen that a Dab-formula is only
derivable from Γ I when Γ is inconsistent, as ∼(pi ≡ pj ) in WI is equivalent to p ∧ ∼p in W . As a consequence,
the following theorem is valid:
Theorem 6. When Γ is consistent: CnAALns(Γ ) = CnCL(Γ ).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
4.2. The inconsistent case
That AALns leads to all and only the relevant classical consequences of a premise set, has become clear intuitively
by discussing some examples in Section 3.3.2. However, the following theorem proves that our intuitions have not
fooled us:
Theorem 7. Γ AALns A iff there is a Γ ′ ⊆ Γ for which Γ ′ : A is an entailment.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Theorem 7 shows us that AALns is equivalent to dCR, the deductive version of Tennant’s CR. From this it follows
that AALns allows for all and only those classical consequences of a premise set that do not only depend on the
inconsistency of the premises in order to be derivable. In other words, the only classical “derivation rule” that is
invalidated in AALns is EFQ.
5. Conclusion and further research
In this paper, I have shown that it is possible to isolate EFQ from CL by means of the ambiguity-adaptive logic
AALns. This is done by proving its equivalence to dCR, the deductive version of Tennant’s CR.
As a consequence, AALns does not limit the “relevant use” that can be made of the classical derivation rules. It
does not, as all other paraconsistent logics do, limit the deductive strength of CL (see Section 1). Shortly put, AALns
is the paraconsistent version of CL, and as such it should be considered as a better candidate than most paraconsistent
logics for replacing CL as the logic underlying human reasoning.
Two lines of further research look interesting to me. First of all, I want to find out whether the “trick with the
indices” can be applied to other logics that validate EFQ as well, f.e. intuitionist logic. Secondly, as some people
might object to the use of indices (because of the fact that it is basically a “trick”), it is probably a good idea to search
for a logic which does not need them.11
11 Unpublished papers in the reference section (and many others) are available from the internet address http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/writings/.
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Appendix A. Metatheoretical proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 5 from Section 4
Proof. We suppose that AI ∈ I(A). Now, the proof has two directions:
(1) Suppose: Γ CL A.
Consider a CL-proof Φ of A from Γ ′ (Γ ′ ⊆ Γ ). From Γ CL A follows that Γ ′I ∪ {Ai ≡ Aj | A ∈ S , and
i, j ∈ N} CL AI , for at least one AI in I(A) (because the set added to Γ ′I neutralizes the effect of the indices).
Now, by the deduction theorem and the metatheoretical characterization of CL: Γ I CL AI ∨ Dab(Δ).
(2) Suppose: Γ I CL AI ∨ Dab(Δ).
Consider a CL-proof ΦI of AI ∨ Dab(Δ) from Γ ′I (Γ ′I ⊆ Γ I). If you replace all formulas in ΦI with their
index-less counterparts, the result will be a proof Φ for Γ CL A∨ Dab(Δ), and because Dab(Δ) is inconsistent
(∼(A ≡ A) CL A ∧ ∼A): Γ CL A. 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 6 from Section 4
Proof. Obvious from Lemma 1 below. 
Lemma 1. When Γ is consistent: Γ CL A iff, for at least one AI ∈ I(A), Γ I CLns AI .
Proof. We suppose Γ to be consistent. Now, the proof has two directions:
(1) Suppose: Γ CL A.
From Γ CL A, together with Theorem 5, follows that there is at least one AI ∈ I(A), for which Γ I CL
AI ∨ Dab(Δ). As Γ is consistent, and as only inconsistencies in Γ will make Dab-formulas derivable from Γ I
(pi ∧ ∼pj CL ∼(pi ≡ pj )), Dab(Δ) is not derivable, which means that there is at least one AI ∈ I(A), for
which Γ I CLns AI .
(2) Suppose: Γ I CLns AI .
From Γ I CLns AI follows that Γ I CL AI∨Dab(Δ) (see Lemma 2 in [4]), which leads to Γ CL A (= obvious
from the second part of the proof of Theorem 5). 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 7 from Section 4
Proof. Obvious from Lemma 2 below. 
Lemma 2. Γ I CLns AI for at least one AI ∈ I(A), iff there is a Γ ′ ⊆ Γ for which Γ ′ : A is an entailment.
Proof. The proof has two directions:
(1) Suppose there is a Γ ′ ⊆ Γ for which Γ ′ : A is an entailment.
(a) Γ ′ : A is an entailment, which means that there is a perfectly valid suprasequent s(Γ ′ : A) of Γ ′ : A. We know
that s(Γ ′) will be consistent, otherwise s(Γ ′ : A) will not be perfectly valid (it would have a valid subsequent:
s(Γ ′ : ∅)).
(b) It is possible for s to map Γ ′ to Γ ′I . In this case, all sentential letters are mapped to a different formula, so
that it is impossible for s(Γ ′) to be inconsistent. However, s(A) (= AI) will not necessarily be derivable.
612 H. Lycke / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 602–612From (a) and (b) follows that s will have to map some sentential letters on the same formulas, in order to make
s(A) derivable from s(Γ ′), so that it must be the case that Γ ′I ∪ {Ai ≡ Aj | A ∈ S and s has mapped those
occurrences of A from Γ ′ which are represented in Γ ′I by Ai and Aj , onto the same formula in s(Γ ′ : A)} CL
AI for at least one AI ∈ I(A). By the deduction theorem and the metatheoretical characterization of CL follows
that Γ ′I CL AI ∨ Dab(Δ) for Δ = {∼(Ai ≡ Aj) | A ∈ S and s has mapped those occurrences of A from Γ ′
which are represented in Γ ′I by Ai and Aj , onto the same formula in s(Γ ′ : A)}. As s(Γ ′) is consistent (see (a)),
it will be the case that Γ ′I CL Dab(Δ) for Δ = {∼(Ai ≡ Aj) | A ∈ S and s has mapped those occurrences of A
from Γ ′ which are represented in Γ ′I by Ai and Aj , onto the same formula in s(Γ ′ : A)} (see Lemma 1), so that
Γ ′I CLns AI for at least one AI ∈ I(A). Now, as CLns is monotonic (see Section 3.3), it is also the case that
Γ I CLns AI for at least one AI ∈ I(A).
(2) Suppose Γ I CLns AI .
From Γ I CLns AI follows that there is at least one AI ∈ I(A), and at least one Δ (possibly empty) for which
Γ I CL AI ∨ Dab(Δ), and for which Γ I CL Dab(Δ). Suppose this to be the case for AI1 and Δ1.
As all sentential letters occur only once in Γ I , inconsistencies are not derivable from Γ I , so that there is a
Γ ′I ⊆ Γ I for which Γ ′I : AI1 ∨ Dab(Δ1) is an entailment.
Now, consider a function s, so that if ∼(Ai ≡ Aj) ∈ Δ1, then s(Ai) = s(Aj ) = Ai . For all other indexed letters:
s(Ak) = Ak . This will give us s(Γ ′I) CL s(AI) with a consistent s(Γ ′I) (as Γ I CL Dab(Δ1)), from which
follows that s(Γ ′I) : s(AI) is a perfectly valid suprasequent of Γ ′ : A with Γ ′ ⊆ Γ . 
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